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Abstract: A recent article in which John Searle claims to refute 
dualism is examined from a scientific perspective. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
John Searle begins his recent article “Dualism Revisited” by stating his 
belief that the philosophical problem of consciousness has a scientific 
solution. He then claims to refute dualism. It is therefore appropriate to 
examine his arguments against dualism from a scientific perspective.  
 
Scientific physical theories contain two kinds of descriptions: 
  
(1) Descriptions of our empirical findings, expressed in an every-day 
language that allows us communicate to each other our sensory experiences 
pertaining to what we have done and what we have learned; and  
 
(2) Descriptions of a theoretical model, expressed in a mathematical 
language that allows us to communicate to each other certain ideas that exist 
in our mathematical imaginations, and that are believed to represent, within 
our streams of consciousness, certain aspects of reality that we deem to exist 
independently of their being perceived by any human observer.  
 
These two parts of our scientific description correspond to the two aspects of 
our general contemporary dualistic understanding of the total reality in 
which we are imbedded, namely the empirical-mental aspect and the 
theoretical-physical aspect. The duality question is whether this general 
dualistic understanding of ourselves should be regarded as false in some 
important philosophical or scientific sense. 
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Searle first contrasts his own anti-dualist approach, which he calls 
“biological naturalism”, to the two forms of materialism, namely 
reductionism and eliminativism, of which he says:  
 
I think in the last couple of decades the weaknesses of reductionism 
and eliminativism have become apparent to most workers in the field. 
However, an odd thing has happened: dualism has gradually come to 
seem intellectually respectable again. One of the main aims of this 
article is to show the incoherence of dualism. Both materialism and 
dualism are false, …(Searle, 2007) 
 
 
Although Searle speaks of a scientific solution, some of his presumptions are 
not in line with contemporary science. For example, he asserts that “All 
conscious states, without exception, are caused by neurobiological processes 
in the brain. We now have an overwhelming amount of evidence for this, 
…”   
 
The empirical evidence from neuroscience, and the other sciences, is far 
from entailing that all conscious states are caused 100% by neurobiological 
processes in the brain. The empirical evidence, which is in the form of 
correlations, does not absolutely rule out the possibility that a person’s 
current mental state could be influenced in some way direct way by his 
immediately prior mental state; influenced in way that is not completely 
explained causally by neurobiological processes in the brain. In the context 
of an argument against a naturalistic science-based dualistic understanding 
of reality, it is both scientifically inaccurate and philosophically ‘question 
begging’ to accept as a science-based premise this strong assumption that 
“All conscious states, without exception, are caused by neurobiological 
processes in the brain.”  Searle also assumes, again without data-based 
justification, that “There is nothing to the causal power of consciousness that 
cannot be explained by the causal power of the neuronal base.” 
   
These two causality conditions can rationally be taken as ideology-based 
desiderata of some hoped-for theory, but not as empirically validated 
premises of an argument against dualism, for they are not empirically 
validated. Indeed, the question of the relationship between states of 
consciousness and states of the brain is coming under increasingly intense 
scrutiny by neuroscientists. For example, recent studies by neuroscientists of 
mind-brain relationships show strong correlations between a person’s 
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consciously felt and reported intent---effectively controlled by laboratory 
procedures specified in psychologically described ways, and communicated 
to the subjects in psychologically meaningful terms---and subsequent 
neurobiological processes in their brain. (Ochsner, 2002: Wager, 2008)  On 
the face of it, these experiments suggest that our consciously felt intentions 
might possibly influence the activities of our brains: that our psychologically 
described experiential aspects, far from being the epiphenomenal by-product 
of physically described brain activity, as required by  nineteenth century 
classical physical theory, could themselves causally affect the course of brain 
events.  
 
Of course, classical physics does demand that all brain activity be fully 
determined by prior physically described activities alone. But the dictates of 
classical physics cannot be relied upon to reveal the whole truth in the case 
of brain activities. This is because brain dynamics depends critically upon 
such things as flows of ions into nerve terminals, and the dynamical 
properties of ions are not correctly specified by classical physics. Absent the 
presumption of the applicability of classical physics to the ion dynamics in 
the brain, one cannot conclude from the empirical data either that every 
brain action is wholly caused by prior brain action alone, or that every 
conscious thought is completely caused by brain activity alone; the empirical 
data is unable to reveal what is causing what.  
 
A scientifically more secure premise, in the present state of neuroscience, 
might be that “All conscious states are caused in part by ongoing 
neurological processes in the brain and in part by the ongoing field of 
consciousness”, without specifying in advance how large the first part is: it 
might be the ‘whole’, but that is something that scientists do not yet know 
for sure.   Yet Searle’s argument against dualism dissolves if one replaces 
his strong philosophical premise by this empirically more secure one.  
 
What is Searle’s argument against dualism? In his section 5, entitled “What 
is wrong with dualism?” he notes that “I have already said that 
consciousness is not ontologically reducible to brain processes. Isn’t that 
already a kind of dualism? Isn’t the irreducibility of consciousness all that 
dualism amounts to?” 
 
He continues: “It is important in answering this question to remind ourselves 
that I said that consciousness was causally reducible, but not ontologically 
reducible, to neuronal processes.”  
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This causal reducibility means fully causally reducible, not the mere partial 
causal reducibility mentioned above, which is the most that the 
contemporary empirical evidence might entail. If we have only that partial 
reducibility, then we are back to something very close to Descartes’ dualism, 
with the admittedly ontologically distinct mental and physical aspects of the 
human person interacting with each other within the person’s brain.  Without 
his strong, but scientifically unsubstantiated, premise Searle would, because 
of his explicitly dualistic ontology, seem to end up with a form of dualism. 
How does he counter that apparent conclusion? 
 
Searle says:  
 
The real objection to dualism is that we cannot give a coherent 
account of reality on dualist assumptions. We cannot give an account 
of reality which makes a part of the real world---our conscious states--
-cohere with our account of the rest of the real world. Dualism 
postulates two distinct domains, but on this postulation it becomes 
impossible to explain the relationship between the two domains. This 
incoherence has a number of consequences. Perhaps most famously, it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explain how brain processes in 
one ontological domain could cause consciousness in another 
ontological domain. Right now I want to focus on another absurd 
consequence that I mentioned earlier: Epiphenomenalism. If 
consciousness has the features of qualitativeness, subjectivity, unity, 
and intentionality, but is not part of the material or physical world, 
then how on earth could it possibly function in the physical world? 
….[Yet] I decide to raise my arm, … and then the arm goes up. There 
isn’t any doubt that my conscious intention causes my arm to go up.  
 
This conclusion, that a person’s conscious intent can cause an intended 
bodily action to occur, is in line with what was suggested by the 
neuroscience experiments described earlier. It is also in line with the 
intuitive understanding of the mind-body connection that is the basis of our 
entire lives. Searle is undoubtedly justified in concluding that this putative 
mind-body connection is real, and that an adequate neurobiological theory 
needs to explain it in a rationally coherent science-based way. 
 
How, then, can we give a rationally coherent, naturalistic, science-based 
explanation of the capacity of our conscious intentions, which belong to the 
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ontological realm of conscious experiences, to affect brain activities, which 
belong to the ontological realm of Material/Physical objects and fields? 
 
To answer this question, Searle proceeds by listing the disparate properties 
of Consciousness and the Material World, respectively, on the left and right 
sides of a table, and asserts : “But we know that my conscious intention-in-
action does cause the movement of my arm.  So what is the solution of the 
puzzle? I think the solution is obvious: Move the ontologically subjective 
features on the left hand side over to the right hand side. … But we will find 
it embarrassing to say subjectivity, etc, are “physical” or “material”….So, let 
us get rid of the terminology….and just say that qualitativeness, subjectivity 
are parts of the real world just like everything else.”  
 
But dualism itself says that the parts of our human natures that are described 
in subjective experiential/empirical terms and the parts that are described in 
objective mathematical/physical terms are both aspects of the full reality: 
our mental aspects and our physical aspects are both parts of the total reality. 
Duality says that reality contains these two ontologically different kinds of 
things, and that they interact in human brains. But this duality approach is 
straight-forward: It does not try to gloss over the distinction between the two 
aspects of reality by moving one over to the other, and eliminating the 
terminology that characterize their differences. 
 
Searle has long insisted that these two aspects are ontologically different. 
This asserted ontological difference has been the basis of his philosophical 
position: experiential aspects cannot be reduced to physical aspects because 
the two aspects have different ontologies. Is this blurring of an essential 
ontological distinction really a philosophically respectable escape from what 
appears to be the dualism inherent in Searle’s dual-ontology framework?  
 
Searle’s only actual argument for this “solution” is that he does not see any 
other way out. He cannot see a naturalistic, science-based, rationally 
coherent way to understand the ‘obvious’ causal power of our thoughts to 
move our bodies, without, in his own words, returning to the old identity 
theory: 
 
“But doesn’t that leave us open to the objection that this is just the old 
identity in disguise?  Aren’t we just saying that conscious states are 
neurobiological states of the brain. Well, in one way it seems to me 
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that so stated the identity theory is absolutely right and could hardly 
be wrong.” 
 
But he goes on to say that most identity theorists---that he knows---“wanted 
to say that consciousness is nothing but neurobiological states of the brain 
described in third-person terms.” Searle’s claim is that he is asserting that 
consciousness is more than just that! 
 
But if a state of conscious is indeed, as he claims, a high-level third-person 
neurobiological state of the brain plus an experiential add-on, and all 
causation is carried by the third-person aspects, then the experiential add-on 
is playing no causal role. But that “solution” just brings us back to the old 
puzzles. Why does the experiential add-on exist at all if it has no causal 
power? How can it evolve in a naturalistic way if has no physical 
consequences? Does not this approach just return us to the absurd 
epiphenomenalism that Searle has rejected so unequivocally? 
 
This failure of Searle’s argument to satisfactorily resolve the old dilemmas 
stemmed directly from his inability to see any other way to avoid 
epiphenomenalism: from his inability to see any other way to account for the 
capacity of our conscious intentions to move our bodies; from his inability to 
see any other way to account for the causal efficacy of our conscious 
thoughts in the physically described world. This narrowness of his vision 
stemmed in turn from the postulated causal determinateness of the 
physically described world that is enshrined in his premises. But according 
to contemporary basic physical theory, namely quantum theory, the brain is 
not actually deterministic in that classically conceived way.  
 
Brain dynamics depends crucially upon the motions of calcium ions into 
nerve terminals, in connection with the release of neurotransmitter 
molecules. These ions are so small that the effects of the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle must be taken into account. Calculations show that 
these quantum effects at the level of the nerve terminals must be large. This 
uncertainty/indeterminateness that enters unavoidably at the nerve-terminal 
level percolates up to the macro-level via the so-called “butterfly” effect, 
and this leads to macroscopic indeterminateness.  
 
Orthodox quantum mechanics deals with this macroscopic indeterminateness 
in a very specific way. The macroscopic indefiniteness generated by the 
microphysical laws is brought into accord with the definiteness of our 
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human experiences by incorporating into the physical dynamics certain very 
specific causal effects of our own thought-provoked actions. 
 
This radically enlarged and dynamically active role of human beings in the 
quantum mechanical conception of nature was often strongly emphasized by 
the founders of quantum mechanics. Thus the closing words of Bohr’s first 
book assert, directly in connection with the problems of life and 
consciousness with which we are concerned here: 
 
That a physicist touches upon such questions may perhaps be excused 
on the ground that the new situation in physics has so forcibly 
reminded us of the old truth that we are both onlookers and actors in 
the great drama of existence. (Bohr, 1934, p. 119)    
 
Bohr repeats this many times in his writings, and Heisenberg’s penultimate 
sentences in his chapter “The Copenhagen Interpretation” of his book 
Physics and Philosophy, are: 
 
Our scientific work in physics consists in asking questions about 
nature in the language we possess and trying to get an answer from 
experiment by the means that are at our disposal. In this way quantum 
theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old wisdom that when 
searching for harmony in life one must never forget that we are 
ourselves both players and spectators. (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 58) 
 
But what are Bohr and Heisenberg both emphasizing in calling human 
beings not merely spectators, but also actors? 
      
The logic and mathematical structures of the orthodox interpretation of 
quantum mechanics were put into particularly clear form by the great 
logician and mathematician John von Neumann. (1932/1955). The essential 
active role of the human agent was formalized by von Neumann as “process 
1”. Prior to the occurrence of any increment of knowledge in any person’s 
stream of consciousness, an associated specific question must be posed. The 
image in the quantum mathematics of the action of posing this question is 
called process 1 by von Neumann. This “process 1” is not caused by any 
physical process described in the theory. Nor is it subject to the famous 
element of randomness in quantum mechanics. Yet it can have profound 
effects upon the subsequent course of physically described events.  
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In actual scientific practice the choice of which question to pose---of which 
process 1 action to actualize---comes from the psychologically described 
realm of the human agent’s interests and conscious intentions. In setting up 
the empirical conditions, it is we scientists that, on the basis of our scientific 
interests, choose the questions that we put to nature. In general, within 
quantum mechanics, it is this capacity of human beings to choose, on the 
basis of personal interests and goals, questions naturally associated within 
the theory with physically efficacious actions, that gives us human beings, as 
we are represented within quantum mechanics, the power to influence our 
own lives in ways motivated by our own values and interests.  
 
In orthodox quantum mechanics, this freedom to choose certain actions 
constitutes an essential part of the process of removing the aspects of 
quantum macroscopic indeterminateness that conflict with the 
determinateness of our actual experiences. These chosen actions are not 
determined by any known principle of physical coercion, but act inside the 
realm of possibilities generated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. In the 
classical approximation that realm of quantum uncertainty collapses to zero, 
thereby producing the physical determinateness of classical physics. Given 
this understanding of how quantum mechanics works, it is completely 
unreasonable, from a contemporary scientific perspective, to impose the 
deterministic aspect of the classical approximation as a premise governing 
the causal behavior of the ion-driven dynamics of the brain of a conscious 
human being.  
 
The odd happening reported by Searle, that dualism has gradually come to 
seem intellectually respectable again, may be due to the growing recognition 
among scientists that premises based on classical mechanics may not 
constitute a perfectly adequate foundation for understanding the relationship 
between ion-driven brain dynamics and conscious observation. Both ion 
dynamics and the connection between physical description and conscious 
observation lie in the province of quantum mechanics!  
 
The technical details of the impact of quantum mechanics on our science-
based understanding of the connection between consciousness and brain 
dynamics have been described in growing detail in several publications.  
(Schwartz, 2005; Stapp, 1993-2009)   These papers give a detailed putative 
dynamical explanation of how our conscious intentional thoughts tend to 
produce the consciously intended physical consequences.  
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Models of the brain based on the precepts of classical physics have not 
produced any comparable explanation of the connection between physically 
described brain activity and our conscious experiences. The reason for this 
failure of the classical-mechanics-based approach is that classical mechanics 
is constructed in a way that leaves out our conscious experiences: classical 
mechanics has no logical place for, or need for, our streams of conscious 
experiences. Our human experiences enter as alien passive spectators of a 
causally closed mechanical universe. Quantum mechanics, on the other 
hand, is fundamentally and explicitly about the structure of our streams of 
conscious experiences: it is a set of rules that are designed to allow us to 
calculate expectations pertaining to future experiences on the basis of 
knowledge gleaned from prior experiences. It needs inputs from our streams 
of consciousness that act in specified ways in the physically described world 
in order to cut the burgeoning possibilities arising from the quantum 
uncertainty principle back down to the complexes of possible human 
experience of the kind that lie in the domain of applicability of the theory. 
The conceptual structure is a rationally coherent unity in which our streams 
of conscious experiences and our physically described brains are tightly 
linked by explicitly specified laws. To ignore these scientific developments 
that are so profoundly pertinent to the issue of the problem of the mind-brain 
relationship is not scientifically reasonable, particularly in the light of the 
persistent failures of the classical-physics-based approaches to provide any 
comparable, rationally coherent, naturalistic explanation of the empirically 
observable correlations between appearances and measurable physical 
properties of the brains that host them.  
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